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Abstract— In underwater sensor networks (UWSNs), one of
the main concerns is to reduce the energy consumption in order
to maximize the lifetime. This work focuses on multiple sensor
networks governed by different authorities. If the authorities
are willing to cooperate by forwarding each others’ packets, the
global lifetime could be increased. However, a selfish authority
could exploit the others’ collaborative behaviors. To investigate
this cooperation, we apply concepts such as evolutionary game
theory. A first analysis of a simple model determines that
cooperation underwater can emerge without incentives. Then,
we explore with an extended model what influences cooperation
and in which way. Finally, we demonstrate how a new authority
can fine tune its strategy when deploying its UWSN.
I. INTRODUCTION
Understanding the key mechanisms of the oceans is crucial
for the knowledge of earth’s climate and atmosphere. Al-
though water covers most of our planet, the underwater world
remains hostile to humans and is little explored. Over the past
few years, there has been a relentless effort to investigate
the abyssal depths of the oceans. This infatuation is highly
motivated by the applications of underwater communications,
such as undersea resources exploration and exploitation, and
their economic implications. Underwater sensor networks
have many applications. Nonetheless, underwater communi-
cations are a very challenging topic to which researchers have
only recently shown a growing interest [11]. In terrestrial
wireless communication, the energy to transmit a packet
increases at least with the square of the distance of transmis-
sion. However in water, it increases not only with the distance
but also with the frequency of transmission. Sensors usually
draw power from batteries and recharging, and changing
them is almost impossible in this case. Therefore, it is better
from an energy standpoint to transmit packets in many small
hops than a single large hop.
In a near future, we forecast cohabitation between un-
derwater applications. For instance, an oil company uses an
underwater sensor network for system parameters monitoring
of an oil extraction facility. In the same vicinity, exploration
vehicles of another company are deployed to find new spots.
Another sensor networks may be owned by the government
to monitor these activities and for other purposes such as
natural disasters prevention or military surveillance. Finally,
non-government organisations deploy their network as well
for environmental monitoring. Thus, the case of a single
authority dictating policies to all sensor networks will soon
be obsolete. Authorities can reduce energy consumption by
mutual cooperation and thus increase their network lifetime.
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This is done by forwarding packets of other authorities. How-
ever, a selfish authority might exploit the others’ cooperative
behaviors.
In the research literature, cooperation among nodes is
encouraged by either reputation or payment mechanisms.
The former is based on the monitoring of a node’s behavior
by its neighbors [7], [8]. Payment schemes try to reward
cooperative nodes [3], [18]. These mechanisms are mainly
feedback based and thus generate additional traffic. In addi-
tion, they are prone to possible attacks. For these reasons,
they are not appropriate for an underwater environment
because of the propagation delay but also because of the
energy consumption. Nevertheless, a common goal could be
enough to encourage spontaneous cooperation.
In this paper, we show first that cooperation can emerge
underwater without incentives. A simplified model demon-
strates that the quality of service influences cooperation.
With a more realistic model, we discuss what affects the
cooperation level and in which way. This model highlights
that the strategies, as well as the topology and the parameters,
are related to the cooperation level. Finally, we demonstrate
how a new authority can fine tune its strategy when deploying
an underwater sensor network. To the best of our knowledge,
cooperation in UWSNs has never been investigated.
The remainder of this paper begins with a brief review
of the literature on cooperation in terrestrial environments.
We introduce the key concepts of game theory and evolu-
tionary game theory in Section III. Then, in Section IV, we
present the system and communication models. Section V
explores cooperation issues by analyzing a simplified model
of UWSNs. The game in Section VI is an extension of the
previous one and focuses on what influences cooperation and
in which way. We relax the assumptions of the first two
games to analyze in Section VII the strategic interactions
between three and more authorities. Finally, we conclude
our work in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Publications focusing on wireless sensor networks assume
that cooperation should be fostered by incentives. Incentives
are usually provided by either micro-payment or reputation
schemes. Cooperation without incentives has been addressed
in [2], [6] for sensor networks. We present in the following
their main contributions and how our work differs from them.
In [6], Felegyhazi et al. consider sensor networks that
are deployed in the same area but controlled by different
authorities. Their model diverges from ours in several as-
pects. First, when a sensor runs out of battery power, the
authority is dismissed and routes are recalculated. In our
model, we recalculate the routes every time a sensor dies
and we wait until all sensors belonging to an authority are
dead before removing it. Second, the payoff is a subjective
value representing the importance of a successful round,
whereas in our case, the payoff is the network lifetime and
is received at the end of the game. Last, when an authority
has a number of received packets below a given threshold, it
still has the possibility to choose actions that could lead to
an unsuccessful round. We restrict this to guarantee a higher
quality of service.
Buttyan et al. [2] study the cooperation in multi-domain
sensor networks governed by different authorities. Their
work is closely related to [6] but has slight modifications.
The authors show that cooperative Nash equilibria exist and
rely on smart strategies that try to exploit the others. Then,
they classify the Nash equilibria into levels of cooperation.
In case there are more than one NE, they select the most
cooperative one. However in our models, we select all Nash
equilibria.
Crosby and Pissinou [5] analyze the forwarding of packets
between authorities of fixed and mobile wireless sensor
networks. Their results show that, in the case of packet
forwarding between mobile wireless sensor networks, the
strategy of always cooperating is not evolutionary stable.
However, in some scenarios, this strategy stabilizes over
time. They also propose the Patient Grim Strategy that
enforces cooperation by punishment and prove that it is a
Nash equilibrium. Compared to our model, the moves of a
player are limited to cooperation or defection regarding an
opponent’s packet. In our scenarios, the decision is made on
both the self and the opponent’s packets. They study only two
strategies, whereas in our work other strategies lead to Nash
equilibria with higher payoffs. The previous rounds do not
influence the decision of the following round. However, we
provide authorities a history to store the previous outcomes.
Finally, the payoffs are subjective values. In this work, we
use the network lifetime as the payoff.
III. INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY
AND EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY
Game theory is a branch of mathematics mainly used in
economics to study strategic interactions between decision
makers. From the seminal work of von Neumann and Mor-
genstern [16], game theory has greatly evolved. It has been
applied in various domains such as politics, computer science
or biology. In this section, we review the key concepts of
this theory, which we will use in the remaining of this work.
Interested readers may refer to [10], [12] for further details
or [4] for the application to wireless networks.
In this work, we will study different models of interactions
and focus on non-cooperative ones. These models are called
games and the decision makers are players. We describe
a game by G = {P,S,U}. P is the set of players P =
{p1, p2, ..., pN} and we use for simplicity p−i to refer to
all players except i. Players pick up one strategy among
a set of possible strategies si ∈ S. A strategy profile s =
{s1,s2, ...,sN} is the set of chosen strategies. Finally, each
player evaluates his choice against the others through a
payoff or utility function ui(s) ∈ U . This function reflects
the player’s objective. We assume that players are rational
and try to maximize their respective payoffs.
There exist two kinds of strategy. When a player takes an
action with a probability 1, it is a pure strategy. A mixed
strategy assigns a probability to each pure strategy. The
player will choose a pure strategy based on the distribution
given by the mixed strategy.
In a game, we are usually interested in predicting the
strategy of each player and find the solution. There exist
many methods to do this. We use here the Nash equilibrium
(NE) concept. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile s∗ =
{s∗1,s∗2, ...,s∗N} such that
ui(s∗i ,s
∗
−i)≥ ui(si,s∗−i),∀i and ∀si ∈ S (1)
In other words, a NE exists when no player has incentive
to deviate unilaterally from his strategy. Every game with
finite number of players and finite number of pure strategies
has at least one NE involving pure or mixed strategy profiles.
Once we have identified the Nash equilibria of a game,
we study their efficiency. By using the concept of Pareto
optimality, we compare strategy profiles to identify the best
Nash equilibria in the game. A strategy profile s is Pareto-
optimal if it is not possible to increase the payoff of any
player without decreasing the payoff of another player.
Previously, we relied on the NE concept to find the
solution of games in which each player uses a strategy that is
the best response to the opponent’s. Once the best responses
are known, neither player will change their strategy. We relax
this assumption to analyze the strategic interactions between
three and more players, thanks to evolutionary game theory.
The evolutionary game theory (EGT) applies biology
concepts to game theory and proposes to study the evolution
and strategic interactions over time in a large population.
The basic idea is that a group of individuals playing a given
strategy will change over time in response to the strategies
played by other groups. Thus, the population evolves. In the
current population, individuals who play a given strategy and
perform better than others will leave more offspring. In the
next generation, the population will change.
The equivalent concept of Nash equilibrium in EGT is the
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) [17]. The strategy s∗ is
evolutionary stable if ∀i and ∀s 6= s∗
1) ui(s∗i ,s∗−i)> ui(si,s∗−i), or
2) ui(s∗i ,s∗−i) = ui(si,s∗−i) and ui(s∗i ,s−i)> ui(si,s−i)
Therefore, a population is evolutionary stable if it is
resistant to invasion by a small number of mutants playing
a different strategy. In other words, we have an initial pop-
ulation of individuals with the same strategy. We introduce
then a small group of mutants with a different strategy. If the
initial population’s strategy is an ESS, the selection process
will eventually eliminate the invaders. The mutants’ strategy
will change to the ESS.
The replicator dynamic specifies how the population
evolves in time. To define what a replicator dynamic is, we
need first to introduce how to evaluate the population and
strategies.
A population is represented by a population profile ~x =
(x1,x2, ...) assigning for each pure strategy si ∈ S the pro-
portion of individuals xi playing that strategy over the whole
population. We denote by pi(σ ,~x) the payoff of the portion
of individuals playing strategy σ and we calculate it as the
average payoffs of individuals playing strategy si:
pi(σ ,~x) =∑
i
xiu(σ ,si)
The average payoff for the whole population is
p¯i(~x) =∑
i
pi(si,~x)
The population is evolved by the replicator dynamic.
Depending on the evolution model we use, there exist
several replicator dynamics. According to Darwin’s theory of
evolution, the fittest individuals should survive and reproduce
for the next generation, and the least fit should die off. We
describe this with the discrete time dynamic function:
xi(t+1) = xi(t)
pi(si,~x)
p¯i(~x)
One generation of the evolution process is as follows.
First, we distribute randomly the strategies to the individuals
with respect to the initial population profile ~x(0). Then, all
individuals play the game. We evaluate the payoffs pi(si)
and p¯i(~x(0)). The population profile for the next generation
~x(1) is updated according to the replicator dynamic and
the strategies are distributed again randomly in function of
the new population profile. The evolution ends when all
individuals have the same strategy. We will use this technique
in Section VII, where we evaluate the interactions between
several sensor network authorities.
IV. SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATION MODELS
To study cooperation in underwater sensor networks, we
consider three scenarios. In the first scenario (Section V), two
authorities have deployed one sensor and one buoy each. The
buoys act as sinks and collect sensed data. Sensors are at the
depth z and the distance between one sensor and the buoy
is the same as the distance between the two sensors. The
sensors have the same amount of battery power. Once one
sensor runs out of it, it is considered as dead and removed.
This scenario is depicted in Fig. 1. The time is divided in time
slots. Each sensor sends a single data packet to its respective
buoy in each time slot. The length of each packet is the same.
The sensor has to choose between a single hop transmission
and two hops, through the other sensor.
The second scenario presented in Section VI is an exten-
sion of the first but with realistic conditions. Each authority
governs a network with the same number of sensors ran-
domly spread in a pool. We explore two topologies. In the
first topology (shared location), the two buoys are located
at the center of the pool, whereas in the second (distinct
location) they are separated at equal distance from the center
of the pool. Everytime a sensor runs out of battery power, we
Fig. 1. A simple scenario with two authorities (black and white).
calculate the routes using the minimum energy path routing
towards the buoy [1]. Every sensor has two paths: local and
global. The local path contains only sensors governed by
the same authority. The global path is computed with all the
sensors. We remove an authority when all its sensors are
dead.
The previous two scenarios have only two authorities. In
the last scenario (Section VII), we relax this assumption and
take more than two authorities. Moreover, we focus our study
on the topology with shared buoys.
Because radio waves do not propagate well in the water,
communication is done by the mean of acoustic channels and
differs in many aspects. The propagation speed is very slow
(around 1.5 ·103 m/s). It varies with the pressure, temperature
and salinity and thus highly depends on the environment.
The transmission loss is caused by spreading and absorption
and is related not only to the distance between nodes but
also to the frequency. In addition, the noise is not the same
and comes from various sources. Finally, underwater acoustic
channels are prone to multipath interference.
According to [15], the minimum signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) for a successful underwater transmission is around
22dB. This communication model aims at guaranteeing a
SNR of 25dB at the receiver. We describe it with the passive
sonar equation [15]:
SNR= SL−TL−NL+DI
where SL, TL, NL and DI are, in dB, the source level, trans-
mission level, noise level and directivity index respectively.
As we consider omnidirectional hydrophones, the directivity
index is 0. The transmission loss over a distance d in meter
for a signal of frequency f in kHz is given by [15]
TL= dka( f )d (2)
Expressed in dB, we have
TL= k ·10log10 d+α( f )d ·10−3
where k is the spreading factor and α( f ) the absorption
coefficient. In the following, we assume a practical spreading
factor k = 1.5. We use Thorp’s formula [14], [15] for the
absorption coefficient in dB/km:
α( f ) = 0.11
f 2
1+ f 2
+44
f 2
4100+ f 2
+2.75 ·10−4 f 2 +0.003
(3)
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Fig. 2. Optimal frequency and minimum source level for a SNR of 25dB.
with f in kHz.
The noise is composed of four components: turbulence,
shipping, waves and thermal noise. For simplicity, we employ
a useful approximation presented in [13], namely:
NL= 50−18log10 f
with f in kHz.
From the above equations, we have the expression for the
signal level
SL= SNR+ k10log10 d+α( f )d ·10−3 +50−18log10 f
In order to minimize the energy consumption, we obtain
the minimum source level by taking the derivative and using
(3) for the absorption coefficient.
∂SL
∂ f
= f d(
2.2 ·10−4
(1+ f 2)2
+
360.8
(4100+ f 2)2
+5.5 ·10−7)− 18
f ln10
(4)
It is obvious that, for any d, the limits of ∂SL∂ f for f tending
to 0 and +∞ equal to −∞ and +∞ respectively. Thus, there
exists at least one frequency f ∗ where the source level SL∗ is
minimal. We use the same assumption as in [13] with a 3dB
narrowband around f ∗. Fig. 2 shows the optimal frequency
and minimum source level to guarantee a SNR of 25dB at
the receiver.
The final step is to compute the energy consumption to
transmit a packet of l bits at a bitrate b bps. As we are using
acoustic waves, the sound intensity of a source is related to
a reference intensity and is given by
It = 10SL/10Ire f
where Ire f =
p2
2ρc with p is the effective sound pressure, ρ
the density of sea water and c the propagation velocity of
the sound wave in sea water. For simplicity, we assume
a constant speed of c = 1500 m/s and we take Ire f =
0.67 · 10−18W/m2.
In the case of cylindrical spreading, the power Pt required
to achieve intensity It at 1m from the source in the direction
of the receiver is expressed as
Pt = 2pizIt
where Pt in watt and z is the depth in meter.
For commercial hydrophones [9], the energy needed to re-
ceive a packet is typically around one fifth of the transmitted
TABLE I
COST MATRIX FOR THE SIMPLE GAME (COST OF ROW PLAYER, COST OF
COLUMN PLAYER).
CC CD DC DD
CC 2c1,2c1 2c1,c1 c1,c1 + c2 c1,c2
CD c1,2c1 c1,c1 c1,c1 + c2 c1,c2
DC c1 + c2,c1 c1 + c2,c1 c2,c2 c2,c2
DD c2,c1 c2,c1 c2,c2 c2,c2
energy. Thus, the energies to receive and transmit a packet
of l bits at a bitrate b bps are
Et = Pt
l
b
and Er =
1
5
Et
In our model, we take a packet size of 128 Bytes and a
channel capacity of 20kb/s.
V. SIMPLE GAME
This game is a simplified model of an UWSN and aims at
introducing the cooperation issues in an underwater environ-
ment. The analysis is split in two. The first part focuses on
non-reactive strategies and the second uses evolution theory
to propose new reactive strategies.
In this scenario, we define a game where the players are
the sensors. In each time slot, a sensor has four possible
strategies that are the combination of actions regarding its
packet and the opponent’s packet. A sensor can either coop-
erate (C) or defect (D). Thus, the tuples are the followings:
CC means that the player will send his packet to the
opponent and forward the opponent’s packet to the
opponent’s buoy.
CD means that the player will send his packet to the
opponent and drop the opponent’s packet.
DC means that the player will send his packet directly
to his buoy and forward the opponent’s packet to
the opponent’s buoy.
DD means that the player will send his packet directly
to his buoy and drop the opponent’s packet.
A cost is assigned to a certain strategy and is related
to the energy consumption of each node. As the energy
consumption is mostly dictated by the transmission loss
(2), we neglect the noise for simplicity. Thus, the costs of
transmission for the two distances is given by
c1 = dk110
d1α( f )10−4 and c2 = dk210
d2α( f )10−4
We do not assign a cost when a packet is dropped. We can
describe the game with Table I in which we show these costs.
A buoy has a history H = (h1,h2, ...,hl) of length l in
which we store the outcome h= {1,0} (success ’1’ or failure
’0’) of the previous games. The success rate w of a buoy is
the number of received packets over the total sent packets.
If the number of moves played is smaller than the history
length, we assume a success ’1’ in the missing history1.
1Simulations tell us that a uniformly distribution of ’1’ and ’0’ or all ’1’
in the missing history are equivalent and lead to the same Nash equilibria.
The information set is the history and the strategies are
a function mapping every possible history to an action. The
strategy space is big. For instance, with the history 01011,
the actions allowed are CC, CD, DC and DD. Thus, for a
history length l, we have 2l possible histories. As a result,
we have 42
l
strategies.
Therefore, we make some restrictions on this space. We
propose two kinds of strategies: reactive and non-reactive.
The reactive strategies take a decision based on the oppo-
nent’s last moves and will be analyzed in Section V-B. When
the success rate is smaller than a given threshold ρ , the
sensor cannot choose risky actions C∗. Therefore, it has to
make only safe moves such as D∗ to successfully transmit the
data packet to the buoy. We can see this additional constraint
as two states: risky and safe states. Moreover, if the opponent
is ”dead”, the sensor plays DD. Non-reactive strategies take
a fixed move in the risky state and also a fixed move in the
safe state. They are of the form m/m′ = ∗∗/D∗ where m and
m′ are the moves chosen in risky and safe states respectively.
For instance, CD/DC selects CD in a risky state and DC in
a safe state. Hence, we have 8 non-reactive strategies. These
strategies are the same two-step strategies defined in [2].
The payoff increases by one at each time slot until the
authority has no sensors left. Thus, the payoff is the network
lifetime.
A. Non-Reactive Strategies
For simplicity, we do not use the full communication
model but only the cost described previously. The sensors are
at the depth z = 600m. The distances between each sensor
are d1 = 1000m and d2 = 1897.4m. The memory slots vary
between 5 and 10. After running an exhaustive search on
the strategies space and playing around with the parameters,
we obtain a matrix containing the tuple of payoffs for each
pair of strategies. With (1) and this matrix, we identify the
pairs that are Nash equilibria. We found that, for ρ < 0.6,
there exist four NE (CD/DC,CD/DC), (CD/DC,CD/DD),
(CD/DD,CD/DC), (CD/DD,CD/DD). These NE have all
the same lifetime. However, above 0.6, a new Nash equilib-
rium (CC/DD,CC/DD) appears with the highest lifetime.
Interestingly, this Nash equilibrium results in full coopera-
tion, whereas the other fours are full defection. Above 0.8,
The four Nash equilibra collapse in (CD/DD,CD/DD) with
a lifetime still below (CC/DD,CC/DD).
These results show that cooperation can emerge under-
water but with slight differences from terrestrial commu-
nications [2]. When the threshold ρ is low, there are 4
uncooperative NE for the underwater scenario instead of one.
In addition, ρ has to be high enough to see a cooperative NE.
It is not the case in terrestrial settings because the cooperative
NE always exists. However, ρ has to be greater than 0.33 to
have the highest lifetime.
B. Evolving Strategies
After the analysis of non-reactive strategies, we wonder if
there exist better strategies. In the following, we extend the
strategy space to take into account reactive strategies based
Fig. 3. Genotype encoding: the history, once converted into an integer,
represents the locus on the chromosome and the related base encodes the
move. For instance, the history 00010 converted to an integer is 2. At the
locus (position) 2 on the chromosome, we find the base 1 which encodes
CD.
on previous opponent’s moves. The idea of this analysis is
to take a set of strategies and evolve them according to
their performance. This should eventually converge to the
best strategies. To do so, we borrow tools from evolutionary
biology and use the well-known genetic algorithm (GA)
optimization technique.
A GA has a population of candidate solutions (individuals)
represented as chromosomes, which evolves toward better
solutions. It requires a genetic encoding of solutions and a
fitness function to evaluate them. We are interested in the
NE leading to the best strategies. Therefore, we would like
to evolve the strategies and to do so, we need to encode
them. Recall that a reactive strategy is a function mapping
a move to every possible history. With a history of 5, the
history 01011 means that the last game was a failure, the
next to last game was a success and so on. As there are 25
possible histories, the chromosome length is 32. The history,
once converted into an integer, represents the locus and the
related base encodes the move (0 = CC, 1 = CD, 2 = DC
and 3 = DD). We interpret the locus of each base of the
chromosome as a decision. Therefore, there are 432 possible
chromosomes (or strategies). Fig. 3 gives an example of this
encoding.
The fitness function measures the quality of a solution
and in our model it is the lifetime. Thus, we would like
to select strategies that achieve the best lifetime. We now
describe, step by step, one iteration of the algorithm. First,
we create an initial population by generating randomly 50
individuals. Each individual passes a validation test to see if
the bases conform to the corresponding history. Recall that
the threshold ρ forces a strategy to be in a safe state and
thus reduces the number of possible moves.
After that, each individual plays the iterated game we
previously explained against himself and the rest of the
population. The parameters of the game remain the same
except for the memory slot of 5 and 10, and ρ = 0.6.
Individuals are selected based on their fitness. We perform
an elitist selection where 10% of the top individuals are
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Fig. 4. Representative chromosome for a history of 5: bases coverage of
the best strategies. The x-axis represents the locus (history).
picked up to feed the new population. Then, we complete
the new population by applying crossover and mutation on
the set of selected individuals. With a probability of 0.6,
the crossover simply takes two chromosomes and swaps
everything between two points set at random. This leads to
two offspring. On a single chromosome, the mutation alters
the bases of each locus with a probability of 0.01. The new
population is then used in the next iteration of the algorithm.
We stop the algorithm after 1000 generations.
We ran 500 genetic algorithms and analyzed the best
strategies. Fig. 4 shows the coverage of the bases for each
locus among the 500 best strategies. In other words, the
chromosome depicted is the representative chromosome of
500 best strategies. The x-axis represents the locus or history,
whereas the y-axis is the distribution of the bases or moves.
The reactive and non-reactive strategies we defined pre-
viously were pure strategies. However, the coverage graph
could be interpreted as a single mixed strategy. If we sort
the distribution of bases by their corresponding success rate
instead of locus, then we can plot Fig. 5 for 5 and 10
memory slots, which is more meaningful than the full-locus
coverage graph. As we can see, the strategy tries to exploit
the opponent while the success rate is high enough. When
the opponent is not exploitable and the success rate drops,
the strategy starts being nicer with full cooperation (CC) but
also stops cooperating (DD). When the success rate is below
the threshold, only safe moves are allowed and, interestingly,
the strategy tends to prefer DD to DC.
We compared this strategy to the non-reactive ones and
found that the only Nash equilibrium was when the two
players use the evolved strategy. Thus, this strategy out-
performs the non-reactive ones. The results of both reactive
and non-reactive strategies support our idea that cooperation
can emerge underwater and could be, depending on the
parameters, the best strategy.
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Fig. 5. Bases coverage of the best strategies ordered by their success rate.
TABLE II
PARAMETERS FOR THE SIMULATION.
Parameter Value
Pool 10 x 10 x 1 km
Position of the buoys (2.5, 5) km and (7.5, 5) km
or (5, 5) km
Memory slot 5
Sensors per authority 10, 20, 50, 100
Distribution of sensors random
Battery 0.001 J
Threshold 0.7, 0.8, 0.9
VI. EXTENDED GAME
In this second scenario, we extend now the previous game
to study the cooperation of two authorities in more realistic
conditions. We will see what influences cooperation and how.
Each buoy keeps a history of the number of received
packets over the total number of sent packets for the last
5 time slots. The success rate of this history is defined as
the average of the value stored in the history. We limit our
analysis to the non-reactive strategies of the previous game.
Again, the goal of this game is to maximize the lifetime of
each network.
In our simulations, we varied two parameters: the thresh-
old ρ and the number of sensors per authority. We made 500
runs for each parameters and each run had a new topology.
We performed an exhaustive search on the strategies space.
For each run, we selected the Nash equilibria that are Pareto-
optimal corresponding to the highest lifetime. Due to the
random distribution of the sensors, the topology was different
for each run. Therefore, a pair of strategies that was a
cooperative NE in one run, could be an uncooperative one
or not even a NE in another run. Hence, we classified each
NE according to its level of cooperation as following:
1) No cooperation: both players forward nothing.
2) Semi-cooperation: one player forwards some of the
opponent’s packets, the other forwards nothing.
3) Full cooperation: both players forward some of the
opponent’s packets.
The summary of the parameters for this simulation is
in Table II. This extended version uses the communication
model described in Section IV.
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Fig. 6. Distribution of Nash equilibria for different thresholds with 50
sensors per authority.
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Fig. 7. Distribution of Nash equilibria for different number of sensors per
authority with ρ = 0.8.
Fig. 6 and 7 provide a comparison between the two
scenarios. The ordinate of each graph shows the percentage
of Nash equilibria for each cooperation level over the 500
runs. In Fig. 6, we see the distribution of NE for different
thresholds with 50 sensors per authority. In both scenarios,
the percentages of Nash equilibria leading to no and semi-
cooperation are almost the same. Full-cooperative NE are
less than 10% for the distinct location scenario and 2%
for shared location scenario. When an authority requests
a higher quality of service and increases its threshold, in
the scenario of shared location, the distribution does not
change. We distinguish a slight modification for the distinct
location scenario, which tends to decrease the semi- and full-
cooperative NE for the advantage of non-cooperative NE.
Fig. 7 shows the distribution of Nash equilibria for 10,
20, 50 and 100 sensors per authority with ρ = 0.8. As in
the previous figure, there are less full-cooperative NE in
the shared location scenario than in the distinct location
scenario. However, we observe that when the number of sen-
sors increases, the percentage of semi- and full-cooperative
NE increases as well for both scenarios. Full-cooperative
NE remain lower than semi-cooperative ones. Around 100
sensors and higher, semi-cooperative Nash equilibria exceed
non-cooperative NE. The number of sensors alters more
significantly the cooperation level than the threshold.
With this game, we have seen what and how coopera-
tion is influenced. In particular, the strategies but also the
topologies and the parameters affect the cooperation level. As
predicted with the game in Section V, a form of cooperation
can emerge spontaneously without incentives under certain
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Fig. 8. Probability of invasion and extinction.
conditions and it consists of at least one network forwarding
packets for the other.
VII. EVOLUTIONARY GAME
In this section, we analyze the strategic interactions be-
tween three and more authorities in an underwater setting.
More specifically, we address the issues of the deployment
of underwater sensor networks when one or more are already
deployed with known strategies, and we study how the
cooperation evolves with the help of evolutionary game
theory.
This scenario has 10 authorities. Each authority governs 20
networks with 5 sensors each. The buoys of each networks
are located at the center of the pool. The parameters are the
same as in Table II except for ρ = 0.8. The strategy set is
the non-reactive strategies of Section V.
The first simulation challenges one strategy against an-
other. The initial population profile is ~x = (0.8,0.2). This
means that a small group of mutants plays against the rest
of the population. We take the average over 100 topologies
with, for each one, 100 runs of the evolution.
Table III shows the percentage of topologies in which
mutants have invaded the population. The rows are the initial
strategy and the columns are the mutants. For instance, the
strategy CC/DC invades at 83.8% the strategy DC/DC but
with only 1.8% the strategy DC/DC invades CC/DC. During
the simulation, we observed that, sometimes, the number of
generations required to kill off the mutants are very short
(around 5 or 10). This usually happens when the current
configuration (topology, distribution of strategies) is optimal
or near optimal for the initial population. We also saw that
a strategy known for being the best for the current topology
cannot invade and eventually dies off. This could explain the
low percentage in some cases.
With Table III, we can plot Fig. 8 which represents
the probability of invasion and extinction of each strategy
against the others. We differentiate three classes of invad-
ing strategies. The first is the strategies that do not seek
TABLE III
PERCENTAGE OF TOPOLOGIES IN WHICH MUTANTS HAVE INVADED THE ENTIRE POPULATION. COLUMNS ARE THE MUTANTS.
CC/DC CC/DD CD/DC CD/DD DC/DC DC/DD DD/DC DD/DD
CC/DC 9.3 13.0 11.3 1.8 8.2 8.9 11.0
CC/DD 7.1 11.6 11.5 3.0 7.3 10.8 9.1
CD/DC 10.4 11.0 11.5 9.2 9.0 10.0 8.7
CD/DD 10.2 9.8 11.9 9.0 10.6 9.3 8.6
DC/DC 83.8 70.7 14.5 13.4 11.3 10.3 11.1
DC/DD 19.4 18.3 13.9 13.8 11.7 11.3 11.2
DD/DC 15.4 12.7 13.6 13.0 11.7 10.9 10.8
DD/DD 11.1 12.6 12.8 12.8 10.8 10.2 11.0
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Fig. 9. An example of evolution.
cooperation like DC/DC or DD/DD with a probability of
invasion below 0.1 and a probability of extinction above
0.1. DC/DC has a probability of extinction higher than the
average because it seems to be the less efficient. The second
class of strategies is those that exploit the others and do not
cooperate (CD/DC and CD/DD). They have a probability
of invasion around 0.125 and a probability of extinction
around 0.1. The last class and maybe the most interesting is
CC/DC and CC/DD with a probability of invasion higher
than 0.2 and a probability of extinction lower than 0.1.
These strategies seek cooperation and cooperate regarding
opponents’ packets.
The last simulation aims at identifying evolution-
ary stable strategies among all strategies. To do so,
we distribute uniformly the 8 strategies to the pop-
ulation. The initial population profile is then ~x =
(0.125,0.125,0.125,0.125,0.125,0.125,
0.125,0.125) and the parameters for the simulations are the
same as previously. Fig. 9 shows an example of the evolution
for the payoffs and the population profile. The oscillations
are due to the random distribution of strategies among the
networks.
The probability of invasion per strategy is depicted in
Fig. 10. The two highest probabilities, respectively CC/DD
and CD/DD, correspond exactly to the two Nash equilibria
found in Section V for ρ = 0.8. Between these two NE, we
found that CC/DD had the highest lifetime and we observe
here that it has also the highest probability of invasion.
We cannot conclude that these two strategies are strictly
ESS because sometimes they die off due to the topology.
We refer to them however as weak ESS. A weak ESS is a
strategy evolutionary stable for some topologies but that has
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Fig. 10. Probability of invasion. The dashed line is the average.
a probability of invasion at least higher than the average.
In at least 80% of the cases, a strategy cannot invade.
Therefore, when deploying an underwater sensor network,
the new authority should take into consideration that the
others might not change their strategies. Thus, the new
authority can take advantage of this and fine tune its strategy
accordingly.
VIII. CONCLUSION
First, we have introduced, using a simple game, the issues
of cooperation in an underwater environment. We analyze
two kinds of strategy: non-reactive and reactive. For the
former, the Nash equilibria lead to either full defection
or full cooperation under certain conditions. To have full
cooperation, the quality of service has to be high enough.
We evolve a set of reactive strategies to find the best one and
observe that it outperform the non-reactive ones. These initial
analyses show that cooperation can emerge underwater.
With realistic conditions, we have shown that the strate-
gies, but also the topologies and the parameters, affect
the cooperation level. As a result, a form of cooperation
can emerge without incentives under certain conditions and
consists of at least one authority forwarding packets for the
other.
We have studied in the last game the evolution of strategies
when a new UWSN is deployed, while two or more are
already running. We have seen that Nash equilibria of the
first simple game are also weak evolutionary stable strategies.
Because the probability of invasion is low, a new authority
wanting to deploy an UWSN should take into account that
the other authorities might not change their strategies. Thus,
the new authority can take advantage of this to exploit the
others.
In future work, we could investigate cooperative schemes
for medium access control, which take into account multipath
propagation. Dynamic topologies with mobile nodes could
also be considered as the water current is not negligible.
Finally, we could focus future studies on cooperative models
of network flows with players of different interests.
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